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Afternoon Session

TESTIMONY OF ROY H. KELLERMAN, SPECIAL AGENT, SECRET SERVICE, RESUMED at 2H101...

    The President's Commission reconvened at 2 p.m.
    Representative FORD. The Commission will come to order.
    Will you proceed, Mr. Specter?
    Mr. SPECTER. Yes, thank you. Mr. Kellerman, immediately before the luncheon recess, Senator Cooper had asked some questions relating to the presence of anyone on the triple overpass which was in front of the President's car. Did you have any occasion, immediately before or immediately after the shooting, to look for anyone on the triple overpass or in that vicinity?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No; I really didn't.
    Mr. SPECTER. Are you in a position to state, then, whether there was or was not someone on the triple overpass?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No; I am in no position to state that.
    Mr. SPECTER. At the time of the shooting, did you observe any bullets richochet off of the windshield or off of any other part of the automobile?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No. If any of the bullets richocheted off the windshield or front part of the car, this would have been matter that was blown over mine and the driver's head from, I would say, the explosion of President Kennedy's head.
    Mr. SPECTER. But aside from the portions of President Kennedy's head which you have already testified about, you observed nothing detectable as being bullet fragments or bullets?

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    Mr. KELLERMAN. No, sir.
    Mr. SPECTER. Richocheting off any part of the car?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No, sir.
    Mr. SPECTER. And did you ever observe any bullet fragments in the car at rest after the shooting?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No, sir.
    Mr. SPECTER. Did you observe a priest at Parkland Hospital?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes; there were two.
    Mr. SPECTER. And approximately what time were they present at the hospital?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. When we brought President Kennedy into the emergency room, the request for a priest was made immediately by one of the members of the staff. I do not recall who called for one. However, in the interim, a second call was sent out. Consequently, two showed; not at the same time, but one after the other.
    Mr. SPECTER. How long were they at the hospital?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Just a matter of a couple of minutes of time.
    Mr. SPECTER. And do you know where they went upon arrival at the hospital?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No, sir.
    Mr. SPECTER. And do you know what services, if any, they performed while they were there?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No, sir.
    Mr. SPECTER. Did you have any conversations with either of them while they were en route, either coming or going?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No, sir.
    Mr. SPECTER. With respect to the state of readiness of Parkland Hospital at your arrival, how long after you got there were stretcher bearers at the front door?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. To the best of my knowledge, there were no stretcher bearers at the car---none.
    Mr. SPECTER. At your arrival?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes, sir.
    Mr. SPECTER. Did some come shortly after you arrived?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No, sir.
    Mr. SPECTER. Well, what sequence did follow with respect to the arrival of the stretchers?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. When we arrived at the hospital, I had called to the agents to go inside and get two stretchers on wheels. Between those people and police officers who also entered the emergency room, they brought the stretchers out. I did not at any time see a man in a white uniform outside, indicating a medical person.
    Mr. SPECTER. When did you first see the first indication of a doctor?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. When we got in the emergency room itself proper.
    Mr. SPECTER. And do you know which doctor that was?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Not by name or sight; no, sir.
    Mr. SPECTER. How many doctors did you see at that time?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. The room was full.
    Mr. SPECTER. Who were the individuals who brought the stretchers on wheels, if you know?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Agents who were in the followup car, police officers who were ahead of us on motorcycles.
    Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Kellerman, did you state how long the autopsy lasted when you testified this morning?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No; I didn't. However, this is going to be an assumption on time; I think I can pin it pretty well.
    Mr. SPECTER. Give us your best estimate on that, please.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Let's come back to the period of our arrival at Andrews Air Force Base, which was 5:58 p.m. at night. By the time it took us to take the body from the plane into the ambulance, and a couple of carloads of staff people who followed us, we may have spent 15 minutes there. And in driving from

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Andrews to the U.S. Naval Hospital, I would judge, a good 45 minutes. So there is 7 o'clock. We went immediately over, without too much delay on the outside of the hospital, into the morgue. The Navy people had their staff in readiness right then. There wasn't anybody to call. They were all there. So at the latest, 7:30, they began to work on the autopsy. And, as I said, we left the hospital at 3:56 in the morning. Let's give the undertaker people 2 hours. So they were through at 2 o'clock in the morning. I would judge offhand that they worked on the autopsy angle 4 1/2, 5 hours.
    Mr. SPECTER. And were you present when the funeral director's personnel were preparing the body?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. I was; yes, sir.
    Mr. SPECTER. And about what time, then, did they complete their work?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. They were all through at 3:30.
    Mr. SPECTER. And what did you do immediately after they completed their work?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. All right. Our communication between the Kennedy family and staff, who were on another floor in the hospital, was in this regard. We had telephone communication whereby we would tell them if the body is ready to be taken out of the morgue and into the ambulance. And they would hit the elevator and come right out the same way. So the 5 minutes it took to load the people in, we left the hospital morgue part at least at 3:50, and, as I say, we were off at 3:56, driving to the White House.
    Mr. SPECTER. And did you go directly to the White House?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes, sir; we did.
    Mr. SPECTER. Did that complete your tour of duty for that day?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes, sir; it did.
    Mr. SPECTER. Now, with respect to the time you were present at the autopsy, was there any conversation of any sort concerning the possibility of a point of entry from the front of the President's body?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No.
    Mr. SPECTER. You have testified about the impression you had as to the source of the first shot, which sounded to you like a firecracker. Did you have any impression as to the source of the other shots, which you described as being a flurry?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. If you will excuse me just a minute. I was trying to elaborate on the last question.
    Mr. SPECTER. Pardon me. Go ahead.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Just for the record, I wish to have this down. While the President is in the morgue, he is lying flat. And with the part of the skull removed, and the hole in the throat, nobody was aware until they lifted him up that there was a hole in his shoulder. That was the first concrete evidence that they knew that the man was hit in the back first.
    Mr. SPECTER. When did they lift him up and first observe the hole in the shoulder?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. They had been working on him for quite some time, Mr. Specter--through the photos and other things they do through an autopsy. And believe it was this Colonel Finck who raised him and there was a clean hole.
    Mr. SPECTER. What was said, if anything, by those present at the autopsy concerning the wound in the throat?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. To go back just a little further, the reason for the hole in the throat, the tracheotomy; I am thinking they were of the opinion that when the--when he was shot in the head, and they had found this piece remaining above the eye underneath; I am sure there was some concern as to where the outlet was, and whether they considered--this is all an assumption now; whether they considered this--that there was a hole here in the throat prior to the tracheotomy, I don't know. But to complete the examination, they lifted him up by the shoulders, and there was this hole. Now, I think you asked me a question. Could you repeat it, please?
    Mr. SPECTER. Well, let's be sure that we have your final answer on the question of any conversation at all about a point of entry in the front part of his body, in his throat, or any place else.

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    Mr. KELLERMAN. I don't believe, Mr. Specter, that it was ever concluded that there was an entry in the front.
    Mr. SPECTER. Then that completes the conversations at the autopsy?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes, sir.
    Mr. SPECTER. On any of the subjects I have asked you about?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Right.
    Mr. SPECTER. The question which I had then started to ask you was whether you had any impression at the time of the second and third shots, which you described as a flurry of shots, as to the point of origin or source of those shots.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. The only answer I can give to that is that they would have to come from the rear.
    Mr. SPECTER. Well, is that the impression or reaction you had at the time of the flurry?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. That is right, sir.
    Mr. SPECTER. Have you ever, since the time of the assassination to this date, had any contrary impression, reaction, or view that the shots came from the front of the President?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No.
    Mr. SPECTER. Now, Mr. Kellerman, with respect to the immediate reaction by you to the emergency situation, did you consider at any time leaving your seat, on the right front of the President's automobile, to go into the rear portion, where the President sat?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No, sir.
    Mr. SPECTER. And what is the basis for--or what was the basis for your conclusion on that?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. After I had heard President Kennedy's voice say, "My God, I am hit," I viewed him, which was enough for me that he was. My decision was to get this man to a hospital, because he needed medical treatment. And during the few seconds that I instructed the driver to get out of here, we are hit, my second instruction was to the man in the lead car ahead of us for the same, to lead us to a hospital, that we are hit. I then turn around, and I had two people injured. Not only was the President down in his seat; the Governor was down in his seat. My presence back there was gone. On top of that, I had Mr. Hill lying across that trunk.
    Mr. SPECTER. What do you mean when you say, sir, that your presence back there was gone?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. They were comfortable, if there is a comfort in this. Mr. Hill was taking care of Mrs. Kennedy. Mrs. Connally was over the Governor; there was no motion. The next thing was a doctor, sir.
    Mr. SPECTER. Did you consider presenting a further shield for the President at that time?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No, sir.
    Mr. SPECTER. Did the metallic handhold which you described early in your testimony as being about 15 inches off the top of the seat and going all the way across the width of the car, did that metal structure present any substantial impediment to your moving from the front seat to the rear seat of the automobile?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Mr. Specter, I think it would have been a small obstacle. However, let me say this: If I thought in my own mind that I was needed back there, there wouldn't have been an obstacle strong enough to hold me.
    Mr. SPECTER. How about the presence of Governor Connally in the jump seat? Would the presence of Governor Connally or any passenger in the jump seat provide a substantial obstacle to your moving from your seat to shield the President's body?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Not at all. It wouldn't have made any difference, sir. Why? Because my job is to protect the President, sir, regardless of the obstacles.
    Mr. SPECTER. Did Mr. Greer at any time use the radio in your car?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No, sir.
    Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Kellerman, did the President's automobile at any time slow down after the first shot?

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    Mr. KELLERMAN. No; not that I recall.
    Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Chairman, that completes our questions, sir.
    Representative FORD. As you turned from Houston onto Elm, you were then facing the triple overpass?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes, sir.
    Representative FORD. You were looking forward at the time?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes.
    Representative FORD. You were not looking to the side particularly, or back at all?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Don't let me change your thought, Mr. Congressman. But as we turned left on Elm, there is also another curve before you get to this overpass.
    Representative FORD. A rather slight curve to the right?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Very much. I still knew there was an overpass.
    Representative FORD. But your concentration was ahead?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Ahead.
    Representative FORD. Not to the side or to the rear?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No; not to the rear especially; that is true. Let me explain a little more. When you are riding in this automobile, which is with him, and on your right side, naturally you are observing more on the right. It is obvious. However, you still have time periodically to glance over to the left for viewing anything that might be of a danger--whether it is people or any other object.
    Representative FORD. There is no way you would know from personal observation in what direction the President was looking at the time he was hit by the first shot?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. That is right; I would not.
    Representative FORD. Could you outline for us here the process by which you were put in charge of this particular operation?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes.
    Representative FORD. Can you outline for us the procedure that is followed in such cases?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes, indeed. As I said earlier, we have three people, for a better word, in charge of the White House detail. Mr. Behn--Gerald Behn--is the special agent in charge. There are two assistants, Floyd Boring and myself. On all trips this was a divided matter. And this one was my trip. Not that I picked it or anything. It was my trip that Mr. Behn said, "You will make this one with the President." The other two people would have other duties to do. And this is how it fell on to me for that day, sir.
    Representative FORD. Once this assignment is made by Mr. Behn, what happens after that?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. In regard to who, sir?
    Representative FORD. To your responsibilities.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. The overall.
    Representative FORD. In other words, from that assignment by Mr. Behn, you take charge; you execute; you make assignments and so forth?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Only one thing. I am not going to say that I don't make assignments. Mr. Congressman, these people all work in a team form. We have three shifts. They work together for a long time, and to say this, that they knew each other's footprints, is probably an overstatement. But they know each other's methods. Let me go back just one step further. I want to give it clear to you.
    Let's say the four or five stops that we had in Texas on this visit--we had one overnight in Fort Worth. All right. Each time, each stop that we make, the individual that we had sent out ahead to set up and coordinate the program with the people in that area, whether it is security or otherwise, through communications for the days he is away, he keeps us abreast of what is going on, who to expect, and so forth.
    And, again, I should say that in the morning of the 22d in Fort Worth, this lad called me Mr. Lawson--asked about the top, whether it should remain on or off, which decision was reached from Mr. O'Donnell. I then asked him--I said, "Are we going to be all right in Dallas?" He said, "Oh, yes; it is a good program." Fine. If and when we ever arrived at that spot, I would ask this

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man, is there anything unusual when we get here. That is a general question that I have given these people all the time.
    Representative FORD. In other words, once the assignment has been made that you handle this trip, and in this case there was first a stop at El Paso, then at Houston--
    Mr. KELLERMAN. San Antonio.
    Representative FORD. San Antonio; then Houston, Fort Worth. You stayed overnight at Fort Worth?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Right.
    Representative FORD. Then you proceeded to Dallas on the 22d?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Correct; yes, sir.
    Representative FORD. As I understand it, when you arrived at San Antonio, the man that is in charge there, you immediately contacted.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes, indeed.
    Representative FORD. When you go to Houston, the same process?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes, sir.
    Representative FORD. Fort Worth, the same?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Fine.
    Representative FORD. And when you got to Dallas, when you arrived there, whom did you see first?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Mr. Lawson.
    Representative FORD. And what did he tell you?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. He said, "Your program is all set. We have all the equipment and there should be no problem here." Fine.
    Let me go back to Fort Worth again. On that night we had an overnight. The gentleman we had working that stop had an added thing thrown into him, which was the speech before breakfast. The President spoke to a crowd across the main street in front of the hotel. After the President retired that night, he and I went down to that parking lot. I said, show me where this man is going to be, where the platform is going to be, where are you going to have all these folks, and how close are they going to be; show me. He did.
    You have got to keep abreast of these things, Mr. Congressman. Well, it is your job.
    Representative FORD. Were all of these men that had charge of these various operations in San Antonio, Houston, Fort Worth, Dallas, men of experience?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Very much; very much so. I want to give you a little information on how these people are selected for doing your advance work out of Washington. In the first place, when they are brought in, you instruct them on everything you do securitywise around the White House. You instruct them in rangework, followup car work, every little phase entailed. Then say you have a little movement in town--the President has a press conference, as an example. He doesn't do that. Send him with an older fellow. Even if he just walks around, learn it. Take him another place, a departure from an airport, or a theater. Give him four or five. Then give him one, give him a little departure at an airport, or a hotel. But have somebody with him. Then there is no mistake made.
    Representative FORD. Now, when these men are assigned to handle the responsibilities in a particular city, such as Lawson in Dallas, is Lawson on the staff here or is he a man from Dallas with the Secret Service?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. These are all people we have in the White House detail, sir.
    Representative FORD. In other words, Lawson was a White House detail man from Washington?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Right, sir. He is one of the men off those three shifts.
    Representative FORD. Now, when was your assignment made as the man in charge of this particular operation?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Oh, I am going to say a week ahead, for lack of a better time in fact, I knew that much of it.
    Representative FORD. November--
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Say the 17th, for a better day.
    Representative FORD. On or before November 17th you got this assignment.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Surely. I knew that I was making a trip, and none of the other two gentlemen were.

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    Representative FORD. What did you do after you got this assignment--what steps did you take?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. OK. The steps that I took--this entails work right here in Washington. First, to determine, to staff people in the White House, who is all going to make it, who are the passengers. This is a thing that those advance people out in the field do not know when they leave. You set up the time schedule--flight time--because the people on the other end want you there at 11:30 in the morning, you have to work back a flight time from Washington, or the helicopter time from the White House. All this is incorporated. Weatherwise--you will use an automobile. Allow a little more time. All right.
    From the people that are out in the field on those 4 or 5 different spots, they are the ones that coordinate with the local folks what program they would like, which is forwarded back, conferred with staff people, whether it is approved, disapproved, added, or cut out. And about the day before you leave, then it is all gelled.
    Representative FORD. But this is your principal responsibility, to pull everything together.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Right.
    Representative FORD. Now, according to the various reports we have, when you know you are going to a particular city, or several cities, you have a method or a procedure to check to see if there are any individuals or organizations that present a serious threat to the President.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes, sir. We have what we call a Protective Research Section. This has been in existence for many years, through Roosevelt's days--I will go back that far. Through the combined efforts of various sources, through other agencies, they have a file on all the, let's say dangerous, for a better word, people that could be suspected in the city he arrives in. They will furnish the agents on those three shifts, if there are a number of them, or even one--it doesn't make any difference--all the data possible on that person-- it will be given to each shift. It is a report form; can be read by all. And, if possible, there is a photograph included. That will be circulated around.
    Representative FORD. Now, when you got your assignment on or about November 17, what did you do in this regard?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. One little thing I should say. Well, I am sorry. One of the first things we do, when a trip is planned, is make a call on that PRS Section and tell them, "On November 21 we are going to be in San Antonio, Houston, and Fort Worth. On the 22d we will be in Dallas, Austin, and at the ranch." And they take it from there.
    Representative FORD. So, on or about November 22d, you made this inquiry.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. This inquiry, sir, would be made a week ahead of time.
    Representative FORD. A week ahead of the date that you were appointed?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. That's right.
    Representative FORD. Who would make that inquiry?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. That would be made by any one of the three people--Mr. Behn, Mr. Boring, or myself, or one other person which I interrupted you a second ago. A departure is given to one man from one of the shifts who would set up a departure from the White House to Andrews. He, too, in turn notifies our Protective Research Section of this thing.
    Representative FORD. Well, do you know who in this case for this trip made that inquiry of the Protective Research Section?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. I don't have the name right now.
    Representative FORD. Would there be a record of that made?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes, sir; yes, sir.
    Representative FORD. I think we ought to have that for the record--the time it was made. You don't recall making it yourself, however.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No.
    The CHAIRMAN. Do you know if it was actually done?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. It is always done, sir.
    The CHAIRMAN. I know. But do you know if it was done in this case?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Not for a fact; no.
    Representative FORD. But you must assume it was done.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Very much so.

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    Representative FORD. Were you given the information from this inquiry, even though you didn't make it yourself?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. What kind of information, sir?
    Representative FORD. Well, about those people who are considered dangerous or a problem in any one of these four or five cities where the President was going on this trip.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. I will have to check this, but there was no record.
    Representative FORD. In other words--
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No information.
    Representative FORD. In other words, PRS never turned over to you any information about any dangerous individuals in any one of these communities on this trip.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. That's right.
    Representative FORD. Is this unusual?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes. But let me reserve the right to recheck that question again; may I?
    Representative FORD. Absolutely. All we want in this case, as in any other, are whatever the facts are to the best of records that are available.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. All right.
    Representative FORD. In the report from the Secret Service it says, and I quote, "Because of the incidents on the occasion of the visit of Ambassador Stevenson to Dallas earlier in the fall, special attention was given to extremist groups known to be active in Dallas. Appendix A describes the action taken in Dallas in more detail." Were you familiar with that part of the Secret Service activity prior to your departure for Texas?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. I have knowledge of that; yes, sir.
    Representative FORD. How much knowledge?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. But not enough to be written up, that I recall, sir.
    Representative FORD. Well, could you describe for the Commission what knowledge you did have in this regard?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. The only knowledge I can describe to you, sir, is the fact that we were aware of what this Ambassador went through down there. However, we had no information that such an incident would happen to President Kennedy on his trip into that State.
    Representative FORD. But I gather from this report, which is the official report of the Treasury Department, that somebody knew of these previous incidents, and was thereby alerted to the possibility of--the potential of one, because the report says, "Special attention is given to extremist groups known to be in Dallas." Now, could you tell us what special attention was given?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No. Outside of the fact that everybody was alerted to this previous incident.
    Representative FORD. PRS, Protective Research Section, didn't tell you, as the person in charge, of any individuals or of any groups that wanted special attention? I am using "special attention" as in the report.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Right as of this minute, the only knowledge that I have of any incident that could happen was in San Antonio, when I believe we had information of some pickets. Now, those pickets showed up outside of--he made a speech at that space hospital. Well, anyway, in view of that, I cannot reach the name right now--these pickets were out at, let's say, the main gate to the grounds, and just stayed right there with their placards.
    Representative FORD. Also on the report it says, "In accordance with the usual practice, the local FBI office informed the local Secret Service office of any information which affected the President's visit,"
    Mr. KELLERMAN. They did. That is the normal practice.
    Representative FORD. That was the normal procedure?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. It is always the normal procedure; yes, sir.
    Representative FORD. Now, whom would they have informed in this case in Dallas?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Their report would have come to Washington, and relayed to our Protective Research Section.
    Representative FORD. And the FBI in this instance gave you what information, if any, that you should relay back to the people--

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    Mr. KELLERMAN. The only thing I can recall right now, sir, are those pickets in San Antonio.
    Representative FORD. Well, may I say if on your return to your office you find any information on this particular point, I think it would be very helpful for the record, and it should be included in the record.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. All right. I surely will.
    Representative FORD. The report also says, "On October 30, 1963, the local FBI office gave the local Secret Service officer the name of a rightwing individual in the Dallas area. An investigation was made. On November 21 and 22 the local FBI office referred two pieces of information to the local Dallas office of the Secret Service." Were you familiar with that?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No.
    Representative FORD. Who would, under your normal procedures, have been familiar with that?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. It would be the same organization, Protective Research Section.
    Representative FORD. But they did not give you any information of this.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No.
    Representative FORD. Is this unusual or different?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. If they evaluated this information, there would have to be a degree of seriousness.
    Representative FORD. But, as far as you can best recollect at this point, you were never so informed.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No, indeed.
    Representative FORD. The report does go on to say, and I quote, "One involved scurrilous literature already in the hands of the Secret Service, Exhibit 4. The second involved possible picket trouble which the local police were aware of." That is the picket trouble you were talking about?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Apparently so.
    Representative FORD. The report also says on page 8, "Special Agent Lawson, SAIC Sorrel, and Special Agent Howlett met with Dallas law-enforcement officials. Special Agent Howlett also met with an informant. They followed up all leads and tips and checked scurrilous literature, Exhibit 4." Did you have any information personally about this activity by Lawson, Sorrel, and Howlett?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No, sir.
    Representative FORD. Was it their responsibility to do it, to undertake that kind of an operation?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Everybody but Lawson. These other two gentlemen you are speaking of are field agents out of Dallas. Yes; they would investigate the seriousness of this thing, through the information furnished by the FBI. And, depending on the degree now, this would be furnished our Protective Research Section here in Washington.
    Representative FORD. Now, did Lawson or anybody else communicate to you what was going on in this regard?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No, no. I do not think Mr. Lawson got in this investigative part at all. It would not be any part of his duties.
    Representative FORD. I am only reading from the report.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes.
    Representative FORD. And the report goes on to say, "Their investigations did not bring to light the name or the individual Lee H. Oswald, and he or his name was not known to them or any other Secret Service agent in Dallas or elsewhere prior to this shooting of the President." Would that be the same as far as you are concerned?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. That is very true.
    Representative FORD. You did not know of Lee H. Oswald?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. None whatsoever.
    Representative FORD. Was it surprising to you that when the President was going to a city as large as Dallas, that there were no names turned over to you, either by your Protective Research Section or by any other Federal agents--individuals or an individual dangerous to the President?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. I recall, to give you an answer, Congressman, that it did seem strange that here we are hitting five cities in one State and--and from

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the apparent trouble Ambassador Stevenson had down there one evening, we certainly should have had some information on somebody.
    Representative FORD. Hypothetically, if you go to other large metropolitan areas, do you normally get names from various agencies, including PRS, warning you of an individual or groups that might cause trouble?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Again I say that our PRS would recheck their files, from all the cities--from all the cases that they have in that city, and furnished us information, whether a report or photographwise. They in turn would--and I believe I am correct on this--they in turn notify the Bureau of this visit, or may have people check through their files. They can doublecheck this stuff. I don't recall any information whatsoever, except that picket thing.
    Representative FORD. It is surprising to me, as well, and I gather it was certainly, on reflection, surprising to you--
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes; it is.
    Representative FORD. Was this in itself any warning to you that there might be some breakdown in the system?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Gee--no; I never cherished that thought, sir.
    Representative FORD. You assumed that the proper liaison between various agencies was taking place, and your PRS was operating effectively?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Oh, yes; very much; yes indeed. Now, if I am wrong, when I check these two questions back here, I will let you know.
    Mr. SPECTER. Congressman Ford, on this line, perhaps I should say that organizationally we are divided into phases where this is a separate phase in terms of protective devices. So, for the prepared part of what the staff has set up, we have by design omitted that portion here, with later witnesses to go into all these questions in some detail for the Commission.
    Representative FORD. I was trying to get from Mr. Kellerman--from his testimony he was indicating that he was the person who from on or about November 17 had the responsibility. And I was trying to trace precisely how this responsibility was carried through, up to the point where you started out this morning. Do I understand, then, that at some later point in the Commission hearings with other witnesses we will go back into the process of how these decisions are made, as far as PRS is concerned?
    Mr. SPECTER. Yes, sir. There will be detailed witnesses on the workings of PRS, and how they functioned with respect to this trip, and what information the FBI had or the State Department had about Lee Harvey Oswald, and whatever coordination, if any, was present. Our thought was that that would be handled separately, organizationally. Certainly, to some extent it is impossible to draw sharp lines of distinction here. But that is the way the staff has prepared the distinctions--with Mr. Kellerman more specifically, as the other witnesses of today, on the sequence of events themselves at the assassination.
    Representative FORD. But, as far as the procedures within PRS and the relationship between the Secret Service, the FBI, and other Federal agencies, that will come up later on in other witnesses who are more familiar with the precise workings.
    Mr. SPECTER. Exactly; yes, sir.
    Representative FORD. Who actually had the responsibility to check the route from the airport to the Trade Mart? I mean to check the route, lay out whatever security precautions should be taken from the outset until the day of the President's visit?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. That was coordinated, Mr. Congressman, between Mr. Lawson and members of the Dallas Police Department, sir.
    Representative FORD. You did not arrive in Dallas until the morning of the assassination?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes, sir; that is correct, sir.
    Representative FORD. As you were in the car, in the right front seat, and the car turned from Main Street right into Houston, you had for a relatively short period of time an opportunity to look at the Texas School Depository Building. Did you look at it; did you notice anything about it? What was your reaction, if any, to that particular building?

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    Mr. KELLERMAN. Not knowing the name of the building--let me say this: When you are driving down this street, regardless of Houston or which, and you have buildings on either side of you, you are going to scan your eyes up and down this building.
    Representative FORD. Did this building create, as you turned into Houston Street, any particular problem that would have alerted you one way or another?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. None whatsoever. It did not produce a thing.
    Representative FORD. Your eyes scanned the area. Did they scan sufficiently to identify anything, to be alerted by anything in any window, on the roof, or anyplace else?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No, sir.
    Representative FORD. Did Mr. Lawson or anybody else indicate to you at any time that the Book Depository Building was a problem?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No, sir.
    Representative FORD. I mean beforehand.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Never mentioned it.
    Representative FORD. Did Mr. Lawson or anybody else discuss with you any particular danger involved in the overpass, the triple overpass?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No, sir.
    Representative FORD. Did you have minute knowledge as to the route in Dallas, or was that left up to Lawson in his judgment?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Left Up to Lawson and the people in Texas.
    Representative FORD. But he did tell you when you arrived in Dallas; what, again?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. And the people in Texas, the police department.
    Representative FORD. What did he tell you? When you arrived in Dallas that morning, he told you something.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes, sir. He said, "This is your reception committee, which is at the bottom of the ramp leading out." I said, "Are we all right in Dallas here all the way for today?" And he said, "Yes; this will be fine." I said, "All right; let's get on with it."
    Representative FORD. When were you first interviewed by anyone regarding the directions from which the shots came?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. I don't recall ever being interviewed.
    Representative FORD. Did you ever make a statement for submission to the Commission or to your supervisors?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Just this statement that I submitted here.
    Representative FORD. Which is included in the Secret Service report.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Yes, sir.
    Representative FORD. Did you have anything to do with setting up the method of trying to apprehend the alleged assassin? Was that outside or within your jurisdiction?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Outside, sir.
    Representative FORD. You did nothing in that regard.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Nothing.
    Representative FORD. I believe that is all. I have to go back to a very important committee meeting, Mr. Chairman. I may be able to get back later, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHAIRMAN. I will be here the rest of the afternoon, so there will be no necessity of your coming back if you are tied up. Thank you very much for presiding all day. Mr. Specter, have you some more questioning?
    Mr. SPECTER. I have just one or two other questions.
    Mr. Kellerman, you referred to a single statement which you said you had made. In the report of the U.S. Secret Service on the assassination of President Kennedy, on Exhibit 12, statement 11--we have the first statement which you made, which is four pages, and that is the one to which you referred, to refresh your recollection earlier today, and I show you what appears to be a second very brief report which you made 1 day later under date of November 30, 1963, with your name and initials, and ask you if you made this one, also.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. That is right; yes, sir.
    Mr. SPECTER. All right. You referred to you and Mr. Boring being the two

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assistant special agents in charge. Is that status the same at the present time, or are there now three assistant special agents in charge?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. There are three. Mr. Rufus Youngblood is the third one.
    Mr. SPECTER. Has that slight shift been made since the time of the assassination.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. That is correct.
    Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Chief Justice, those are my only additional questions, sir.
    The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Craig, would you like to ask any questions, or do you think of any other avenue that we should explore here?
    Mr. CRAIG. No, sir; thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. As the interrogation has progressed, I have been handing notes to counsel and he has been very kind in asking those questions.
    The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murray, can you think of anything?
    Mr. MURRAY. No, thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Mr. SMITH. Off the record.
    (Discussion off the record.)
    Mr. CRAIG. Mr. Kellerman, is there any special agent in charge of the protection of the person next in line in succession, to your knowledge?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. I think Mr. Rowley would like to man that. I think they have had a little difficulty to find a man.
    Mr. CRAIG. There is no such person now?
    Mr. KELLERMAN. No, they have made numerous attempts with the people, and so far they have got a negative reply.
    The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Kellerman, thank you very much, sir, for your attendance and for your testimony.
    Mr. KELLERMAN. Thank you, sir.
    (At this point, Representative Ford left the hearing room.)
    The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Specter.
    Mr. SPECTER. We will call Mr. Greer.
    The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Greer, how do you, sir. Mr. Greer, will you raise your right hand and be sworn.
    Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before this Commission, so help you God?
    Mr. GREER. I do.
    The CHAIRMAN. Would you be seated, please.