Richard Helms

Richard Helms2
Richard Helms 3
Richard Helms 4

NOTE: The testimony of Richard Helms, before the HSCA, has been divided into four separate pages because of its size.

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD HELMS, FORMER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO IRAN, AND PRESENTLY A BUSINESS CONSULTANT IN WASHINGTON, D.C., AND REPRESENTED BY GREGORY B. CRAIG, OF WILLIAMS & CONNELLY beginning at 4HSCA5...

Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Helms. We appreciate your being here today, and the Chair will recognize Mr. Goldsmith to begin the questioning.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Helms, as part of your association with the CIA were you

required to execute a secrecy oath?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I was.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you recall testifying before this committee in

executive session on August 9 of this year?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I do.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. At that time, Mr. Helms, were you presented

with a series of letters which authorized you to testify fully and

truthfully about all information that you had available pertinent

to the committee's legislative mandate?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. At this time I would ask that Mr. Helms be

shown JFK exhibit F-536.

Mr. Chairman, I would indicate for the record that JFK exhibit

F-536 consists of two exhibits, A and B. They are both letters dated

September 1, 1978, from the General Counsel's Office of the CIA.

They are directed to Mr. Helms. [Handed to witness.]

Mr. Chairman, may we have JFK exhibits F-536A and F-536B

admitted into the record?

Mr. PREYER. Without objection, so ordered.

JFK EXHIBIT F-536A

OGC 78-6272

21 September 1978

The Honorable Richard Helms

Safeer Company

Suite 402

1627 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Ambassador Helms:

The Agency has been notified that the House Select

Committee on Assassinations has invited you to testify in

open session on 22 September 1978.

Please be advised that the Agency agreement with the

Committee, a copy of which was attached to Mr. Carlucci's

letter to you dated 27 July 1978, deals only with the dis-

cussion of classified matters in executive session. It does

not constitute a grant of authority to discuss classified

matters in public circumstances, nor a waiver of any secrecy

oath or agreement that might otherwise be applicable in such

circumstances. Therefore, if you are asked any questions in

open session requiring the disclosure of classified informa-

tion, I suggest that you indicate to the Committee your

willingness to respond in executive session and that you ask

the Committee to convene such a session for that purpose-

Sincerely,

Anthony A. Lapham

General Counsel

JFK EXHIBIT F-536A

JFK EXHIBIT F-536 B

21 September 1978

The Honorable Richard Helms

Safeer Company

Suite 402

1627 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Ambassador Helms:

By way of elaboration upon Mr. Lapham's letter to you

of this date concerning your testimony in open session

before the House Select Committee on Assassinations on

22 September, Mr. Lapham has authorized me to relay the fol-

lowing to you. You are, of course, completely at liberty to

discuss unclassified materials, including the materials

which have been declassified and made available to your

counsel on 20 September 1978. However, in the event a

response would involve the disclosure of classified infor-

mation, whether based on these or other materials, it is the

Agency's position that you should so inform the Committee

and request that your response be heard in executive session.

Sincerey,

John D. Morrison Jr.

Deputy General Counsel

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, have you received the originals of

these letters?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I have.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Have you had a chance to discuss these letters

with your attorney?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you understand these letters?

Mr. HELMS. I hope so.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you understand that at today's hearing you

are still obliged to testify truthfully before this committee?

Mr. HELMS. I understand that.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you understand, Mr. Helms, that in the event

that your testimony touches upon classified information, the alter-

native would be to request that the committee go into executive

session?

Mr. HELMs. I understand that, sir.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I would indicate for the record that the letters

that Mr. Ambassador was shown at the August 9 hearing corre-

spond with JFK exhibits F-94, F-125, F-126, and F-127.

Mr. Helms, what was the organizational function of the Deputy

Directorate for Plans in 1963?

Mr. HELMS. The Deputy Director for Plans or the Deputy Direc-

torate for Plans? I was the Deputy Director for Plans and head of

an organization which performed certain covert activities overseas.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Before you proceed I would like to show you JFK

exhibits F-94, F-125, F-126, and F-127 from the hearing that we

had in August.

[Handed to witness.]

Mr. HELMS. Thank you. [Pause.] I have not read every word of

those memoranda, Mr. Goldsmith, but I recall having seen them on August 9.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. At the time did you understand them?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I might ask, for the record, would Mr. Helms'

attorney identify himself.

Mr. CRAIG. My name is Gregory B. Craig, of Williams & Con-

nolly.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Thank you. Returning to my previous question,

would you describe the organizational function or purpose of the

DDP in 1963 which I believe you headed.

Mr. HELMS. That is one of the most--it contained one of the most

highly classified documents in Washington, the description of what

the DDP does, and if you have received a specific authority from

the Director of Central Intelligence to disclose all these activities, I

would be glad to do so.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I would ask that Mr. Helms be given a copy of

the declassified transcript from his executive session testimony.

Mr. Helms, I refer your attention to page 4 of that transcript,

specifically lines 111 through 118.

Mr. HELMS. All right, Mr. Goldsmith. Since this has been declas-

sified, I understand, then let me just read what it says:

In 1963, the Deputy-Director for Plans was * * * the Deputy Director who was in charge of--I guess the simplest term is--overseas operations. This entity of the CIA received its mandate from NSC documents.

In any event, the responsibility of this unit was to conduct espionage and counterespionage and covert actions outside the continental limits of the United States.

Some of the lines you will note have been excised.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I understand.

Mr. HELMS. So if to the press it is not a coherent statement, it is

because it is not coherent.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, I would ask to the extent you are

able to testify without touching upon classified information you

make an effort to do so. Have you had a chance to review the

declassified transcript that the committee made available to you?

Mr. HELMS. Yes. I have looked through it. I am not sure, though,

that I have become aware of all of the things that have been taken

out and all the things that have been left in. It is really difficult to

read something that has been chopped up the way this has. I have

looked through it but I would not say I have in my head what was

allowed in and what was taken out.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, did the committee make available to

you the testimony from your executive session transcript?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I have in front of me these documents which

were made available to me by the committee I think 2 days ago. I

went through them.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I understand that. My question now is, Has the

committee made available to you the full transcript from your

executive session testimony?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I believe I could have come and read it at any

time, at least I was so assured by the committee.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did you ever avail yourself of that opportunity?

Mr. HELMS. I did not.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, what role, if any, did the Agency

have in the investigation of the assassination of President

Kennedy?

Mr. HELMS. At the time that the Warren Commission was

formed, the Agency did everything in its power to cooperate with

the Warren Commission and with the FBI, the FBI having the lead

in the investigation. As best I can recollect, it was the Agency's

feeling that since this tragic event had taken place in the United

States, that the FBI and the Department of Justice would obviously

have the leading edge in conducting the investigation, and that the

Agency would cooperate with them in every way it was possible,

and the same applied to the Warren Commission.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. So I take it, then, that the Agency perceived its

role to be somewhat secondary to the role of the FBI?

Mr. HELMS. That is correct.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. What were your specific responsibilities with

regard to the investigation?

Mr. HELMS. As the Deputy Director for Plans, I regarded my

responsibility as being one which saw to it that inquiries given to

the Agency by the FBI or originated with the Warren Commission,

were answered as well and as expeditiously as possible.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Which staff or unit within the CIA was given

primary responsibility for coordinating the investigation?

Mr. HELMS. After I believe maybe 2 or 3 weeks following the

assassination, the counterintelligence staff in the Deputy Director-

ate for Plans was given the job of coordinating and handling the

inquiries which came in and the replies which went back, both to

the FBI and to the Warren Commission, and as you are aware, the

so-called counterintelligence stall had the job in any event of carry-

ing on liaison on covert matters with the FBI for the CIA.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Would you describe in general terms what the

organizational function of the counterintelligence staff was in

1963?

Mr. HELMS. In the organization of the Deputy Director for Plans

at that time we had a series of staffs. These staffs were assigned

functions in terms of the mission of the entire DDP. There was a

foreign intelligence staff which dealt with the acquisition of normal

intelligence. There was a counterintelligence staff which provided

staff guidance to the rest of the organization in counterintelligence

say that the counterintelligence staffs mandate was somewhat wider than the others because the CIA had the mandate within the intelligence community to maintain basic files on counterintelligence cases, counterespionage cases, originating overseas.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Was the investigation of the death of President

Kennedy perceived as a counterintelligence-type case?

Mr. HELMS. It was not perceived in any specific terms at all that

I recollect. It was perceived as a great national tragedy, and I

think the feeling in the Agency was that anything it or its person-

nel could do to help resolve the questions that prevailed at the

time, we would try to do, whether it was counterintelligence, posi-

tive intelligence, or what it was.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Are you able to state why the CIA staff in particu-

lar was given this responsibility?

Mr. HELMS, Well I think one of the more compelling reasons was

that since it had had through the years the responsibility for

carrying on liaison with the FBI, that it was in a better position

and used to dealing with that Agency and therefore it was sensible

to have them continue to.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Now prior to giving the CI staff this responsibil-

ity was the chief of one of the Western Hemisphere desks desig-

nated to coordinate the flow of information at CIA headquarters?

Mr. HELMS. I believe in the early day after President Kennedy's

demise that there was a feeling that the principal point of interest

as far as the Agency was concerned was Mexico City, where infor-

mation, had been provided by the CIA to the rest of the Govern-

ment that someone called Lee Harvey Oswald had been in touch

with the Soviet and Cuban Consulates there. Once it was estab-

lished that this investigation was going to be Far more wide rang-

ing than just Mexico City, the responsibility was transferred.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did this particular desk officer ever-complain to

you about interference with Mr. Angleton, who was then chief of

the CIA staff?

Mr. HELMS. I do not recall any complaint, Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you recall whether this desk officer had any

particular responsibilities with regard to the investigation after the

responsibility for coordinating the investigation was transferred to

the CIA staff.

Mr. HELMS. I don't have any recollection of the details.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. What role, if any, did Mr. McCone, who was

then Director of Central Intelligence, have in the Agency's investi-

gation?

Mr. HELMS. I think that he had the role any Director would have

had that was to see to it that sufficient manpower and funds and

other resources of the Agency were put to work in support of the

Warren Commission and the FBI. And I recall certainly that he

maintained a continuing and abiding interest in these proceedings.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Was he kept regularly apprised of the develop-

ments of the investigation?

Mr. HELMS. I would have thought that he was. I can't tell you in

precise detail 15 years later, but he had every opportunity 5 days a

week at the agency staff meeting to ask any questions on his mind,

and we had every opportunity to pass on to him anything that had

come up we thought would be of interest.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Has Mr. McCone ever indicated to you that he

was not satisfied with the flow of information from below upstream

to him?

Mr. HELMS. In connection with this investigation?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. HELMS. Not that I am aware of, Mr. Goldsmith. I think, if

knowing Mr. McCone, if he had been dissatisfied he would have

made his dissatisfaction clear and I wouldn't have forgotten it.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. You mentioned earlier that the responsibility for

investigating this case was primarily in the hands of the FBI and

the CIA saw itself serving as a support function. Do you think this

division of responsibility was adequate?

Mr. HELMS. But I think it is the only way the matter could have

been handled. I can't conceive of its being handled any differently.

There has to be one investigative organization in charge of an

investigation, and I can't see how this could have been otherwise.

Am I missing something here?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I am not suggesting that you are missing any-

thing, Mr. Helms.

Mr. Helms, were there any substantive or procedural problems

between the Bureau and the CIA in conducting the investigation?

Mr. HELMS. I don't recall any procedural problems. As for ques-

tions of substance, my memory is not all that clear. I don't know

whether there were some small disagreements about certain as-

pects of this case or not. Certainly investigators, no matter how

well motivated tend to have different emphases, and it may well

be that there were some, but nothing that looms large in my mind

today.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you recall specifically whether there was any

disagreement in the handling of the Nosenko case?

Mr. HELMS. I don't recall any disagreement about the so-called

handling of the Nosenko case. There was I believe a difference of

interpretation as to what Nosenko represented. It was my impres-

sion that the FBI had passed on what Nosenko had to say about

Lee Harvey Oswald to the Warren Commission exactly the way

Nosenko had given it to them and that at a later date it was

necessary to point out to the Warren Commission that the bona

Mr Nosenko had not been established.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did the agency's investigation reflect any work-

ing hypotheses? By that question I mean, Did any particular aspect

of the investigation receive emphasis?

Mr. HELMS. You mean inside the CIA?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. HELMS. Oh I think there was concern among many officers

working on these matters that the Soviets might have been in-

volved in this in some fashion and that the Cubans might have

been involved in some fashion, I imagine we shared the concerns of

the Warren Commission at the time. After all, there is a lot of give

and take and conversation and meetings back and forth and one

organization obviously influences the sensations of another

organization.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did the Agency pay particular attention to the

area of foreign conspiracy? You made reference to Soviet involve-

ment and Cuban involvement. Was that the primary focus?

Mr. HELMS. That was obviously a matter of prime concern and since Nosenko was in the Agency's hands this became one of the most difficult issues to face that the Agency had ever faced. Here a President of the United States had been murdered and a man had come from the Soviet Union, an acknowledged soviet intelligence officer, and said his intellignece service had never been in touch with this man and knew nothing about him. This strained credulity at the time. It strains it to this day.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Was all information pertinent to the Warren Commission's work promptly given to the Warren Commission, M.r Helms?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know how to answer that question, Mr. Goldsmith. I thought we made a major effort to be as cooperative and prompt and helpful as possible. But in recent years I have been through enough to recognize that you can't make a flat statement about anything, so I don't know. Maybe there were some places where it wasn't as prompt as it should have been. But I am not in a position to identify them.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Are you able to state what factors generally governed

whether information was made available to the Warren Commission---

Mr. HELMS. I misunderstood the first part of your question.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Are you able to state what factors governed whether information was made available to the Warren Commission---

Mr. HELMS. I don't think there were any governing factors except

the necessity for us to be careful about our sources and methods in

certain cases, and I believe that obstacle was gotten over by going

down and having conversations with the Warren Commission at

various times in order to make these points clear on what the

issues were, I don't believe we held anything back.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. As a general rule, did you wait to receive an

inquiry from the Commission prior to passing information on to

the Warren Commission?

Mr. HELMS. Yes; I believe so.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Turning to another area now, to what extent, if any, did Mr. Dulles, former Director of the CIA, play a special role on the Warren Commission insofar as the Agency was concerned?

Mr. HELMS. I don't have any sensation that he played any special role. He obviously was in tough with the Agency on two or three occasions, as was only natural under the circumstances. He had been director of it for a long time and he would obviously feel more comfortable dealing with people in the Agency than he might in other agencies of the Government. But I don't recall this had any particular force and effect as far as the conduct of the agency was concerned or the conduct of the Warren Commission investigation.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. To what extent did he attempt to represent the interests of the CIA while serving as a member of the Warren Commission?

Mr. HELMS. I have no idea, Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. At this time I would ask that Mr. Helms be shown JFK F-529.

[Documents handed to witness.]

Mr. PREYER. If there is no objection, exhibit F-529 will be admitted into the record.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. That's F-529.

[Whereupon, exhibit F-529 was received.]

JFK EXHIBIT F-529

8 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Discussion with Mr. Dulles

Re the NOSENKO Information

on OSWALD

1. Mr. Dulles, With whom I spoke today, recalled

his earlier conversation with you on this subject and

said that there were still some members of the Commis-

sion who were concerned Rest they suppress the NOSENKO

information now only to have it surface at a future

date. They expressed concern that this could possibly

prejudice the entire Warren Commission report. I told

Mr. Dulles that this concern was understandable but

that we still felt the best course by far would be to

omit any reference to the NOSENKO information in the

final report. While it is conceivable that NOSENKO

might someday be in a position to claim that he provided

information on the KENNEDY assassination, I said that

the difference between NOSENKO's situation and that of

other bona fide defectors was such that it would be less.

likely that NOSENKO would be allowed to surface in this

way. I noted that if the NOSENKO information were in-

cluded as is in the final Commission report and then

later the facts of NOSENKO's agent mission became public

knowledge, this could have perhaps an even greater nega--

tive affect on the standing of the Commission's report.

The only way for the Commission to avoid this and still

use the information would be for them to indicate that

doubt existed regarding the source of the information.

We would be opposed to this because it would signal to

NOSENKO's principals something of how we viewed this case

and could also bring about renewed press and public in-

terest in NOSENKO.

2. Mr. Dulles and I then exchanged views on the

possibility of finding language which would allude to

the existence of other, unverified information on the

OSWALD case. This language would permit the Commission

to say if challenged in the future on this issue that it

had taken the NOSENKO information into consideration in

JFK EXHIBIT F-529 cont.

the final report but at the same time it would not be

presented in a manner which would be at variance with

the important operational considerations we have raised.

3. It was agreed that an effort might be made to

find such language if Mr. Dulles is again unsuccessful in

persuading his colleagues to eliminate any reference to

the NOSENKO information from the report. To attempt

this, however, we would have to know precisely in what

context the Commission intended to make use of the

NOSENKO information. This, Mr. Dulles will have to

determine from Mr. Rankin. He will do this as soon as

possible. He knows that I am leaving this week and

therefore, will contact you as soon as he has the infor-

mation he needs from Mr. Rankin.

4. I have briefed C/SR/CI on these latest

developments and since he and CIA Officer in my shop are

fully cognizant of all the problems involved, they can

work out language for your approval which hopefully will

be satisfactory. C/SR/CI knows Mr. Dulles and would

be the most suitable person to work with him directly if

this is indicated.

Chief, SR Division

JFK EXHIBIT F-529 cont.

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief SR

1. Nosenko's answers to our questions appear to be quite

complete. No really new information appears and they are consistent with his

previous statements. Their chief value lies in the fact that they elaborate

what he has said before concerning OSWALD in the USSR. The details he

provides concerning KGB involvement in the OSWALD case eliminate a number of

minor obscurities which were present in his earlier statements but they do

not change the overall picture of OSWALD's status and activities in t he

USSR.

2. There are, however, some rather surprising statements in Nosenko's

replies - and these statements may call into question all or part of his

story. For example:

a) he says (paragraph 5) that although the KGB recognised that OSWALD

might have been an American agent, no "unusual measures" were taken to check

on this possibility since it had already been decided not to let igim stay in

the USSR.

b) he says (paragraph 16) that the KGB did not consider recruiting

Marina to report on OSWALD "because she was his wife and it was considered

dangerous to recruit a wife to report on her husband

JFK EXHIBIT F-529 cont.

c) he repeatedly refers to KGB recognition that OSWALD

"was not normal" as the reason for KGB failure to take various steps which it

could normally be expected to take vis-a-vis a foreigner like OSWALD. In

other words, a lack of normality and the KGB's recognition of it provide the

peg for the whole story of KGB hankling of the OSWALD matter.

3. Another sequence of events, as related by Nosenko is noteworthy. he

states that Marina had no trouble marrying OSWALD because he was a resident

of and working in the USSR, and that she had no difficulty leaving the country

because she was married to a foreigner. This reasoning seems to overlook the

fact that OSWALD had already declared his intention via mail to the US.

Embassy) to leave the USSR. If this fact were known to the KGB as we must

presume it was, we would expect Marina's marriage request to have given more

than routine consideration.

4. Although I believe that the Commission would be interested in the

entire set of questions and answers as a follow-up to the information it

received earlier from Nosenko via the FBI, perhaps you will think it not

advisable to send them on at this late date, especially in view of the

continuing doubts concerning Nosenko's bona fides. There are no specific

points in

JFK EXHIBIT F-529 cont.

specific points in this latest information that change the Oswald story or add

significantly to it and would therefore warrant separate transmittal to the

Commission in my opinion. When the results of our further checks into

Oswald's arrival time in Helsinki are in, we might send along with them

Nosenko's statemetn that a 2-4 day delay in obtaining a Soviet tourist visa is

not uncommon.

C/SR/CI/ Research

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I would ask that you skim through exhibit

F-529, Mr. Helms, paying particular attention, however, to para-

graph No. 3.

Mr. HELMS. Yes; I have read paragraph 3.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Does this exhibit, Mr Helms, refresh your

memory on the extent to which Mr. Dulles may have represented

CIA interests while serving "as a member of the Warren

Commission?

Mr. HELMS. I don't read that memorandum that way Mr. Gold-

smith. I read this memorandum to say that since the Agency was

not able to, what shall we say, vouch for the bona fides of Mr.

Nosenko, that this was going to have an effect on the Commission

report and what the Commission had to say and the point at issue

here, if I read this correctly, was how best to have the Commission

word its report, come to its conclusions without leaving itself hang-

ing on a limb on the basis of the fact that they thought that Mr.

Nosenko was bona fide when in fact this had not been demon-

strated. That is the way I read this memorandum.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I certainly understand what the central issue is.

My question is whether Mr. Dulles was attempting to represent the

Agency views to the Warren Commission.

Mr. HELMS. I don't get that from reading this exhibit. I believe in

reading the material that you have made available to me that the

gentleman who signed this memorandum made that deposition

before you, and I assume that you asked him what he thought

about it. Did he give a different answer?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, I am sorry but I am not in a position

today to answer your questions.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my initial line of inquiry. I would

defer to you at this time, sir.

Mr. PREYER. The Chair recognizes Congressman Stokes for such

time as he may consume for the questioning of the witness.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Ambassador Helms.

Mr. HELMs. Good morning, Mr. Stokes.

Chairman STOKES. Mr. Helms, I wonder if you would tell us what

role, if any, you played with regard to Mr. Nosenko.

Mr. HELMS. When Nosenko defected in Geneva and came to the

United States, or was brought to the United States, in my position

as Deputy Director for Plans, I obviously was involved in the basic

decisions that were going to have to be made or were made in now

and the past involving the interrogation of him, his handling, and

what we would do with respect to finding out what he represented

and what information he had to purvey.

Chairman STOKES. So would it be fair to say that right from the

very beginning of the initial contact with him, right on through his

custodial period here in the States, that you were constantly in

charge of that situation?

Mr. HELMS. No; I was not constantly in charge of it. In fact, I

was not in charge of it from the first day because I do not think

any Deputy Director regards himself as being in charge of any-

thing when he has a Director who is really in charge, plus the fact

there were other members of the Interagency Defector Committee

which is composed of other agencies of Government interested in

these matters. They also have a say in what happens with respect

to these things. So I certainly was involved with decisions on

Nosenko from beginning to end, but I was not the controlling

authority at all times.

Chairman STOKES. There were three major agency reports that

were written in regard to the Nosenko case; specifically there was

a report in 1968 issued by the Soviet Russia Division, another

report later in 1968 called the Office of Security report, and then a

third report in 1976, referred to as the Hart report.

Would you tell us whether you are familiar with all three of

these reports?

Mr. HELMS. I don't recall any longer whether I read the first two

or whether I was simply briefed on their contents. The Hart report

I have never seen. I left the agency in early February 1973 and I

have had no substantive connections with it since.

Chairman STOKES. During his defection in 1964 and upon his

arrival in the United States was Yuri Nosenko in the custody of

the CIA?

Mr. HELMS. I am sorry, I missed the question.

Chairman STOKES. I was asking precisely during his defection in

1964 and upon his arrival in the United States, was Yuri Nosenko

in the custody of the CIA?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, he was. That was an accepted procedure under

the functioning of the Interagency Defector Committee that defec-

tors that came to this country were handled by the CIA, through

the interrogation period, resettling period, whatever had to be done

to them.

Chairman STOKES. Is that the legal authority under which he

was being detained?

Mr. HELMS. No. I think that perhaps, Mr. Chairman, if you

would not mind, I would like to answer that question a little bit

more fully. If you would indulge me.

Chairman STOKES. Certainly.

Mr. HELMS. Two days ago, on September 20, 1978, I received a

transcript of my testimony before this committee in executive ses-

sion on August 9. While reviewing that transcript I noted that,

although I am not a lawyer, I characterized Mr. Yuri Nosenko's

legal status with the CIA between 1964 and 1969 in a number of

different ways. Since this is an area of obvious interest to the

committee, I would like to take this opportunity to describe my

understanding in somewhat greater detail as to what Mr. Nosen-

ko's legal status with the Central Intelligence Agency was.

As I say, I am neither a lawyer nor a judge, so I was not

reared to draw any legal conclusions about Mr. Nosenko's tenure

with the Central Intelligence Agency. I'm sorry, I am not prepared.

On January 23, 1964, in Geneva, Switzerland, Mr. Nosenko re-

quested that he be permitted to defect to the West. Mr. Nosenko's

request I believe was accompanied by a claim that he could give a

comprehensive report on Lee Harvey Oswald's contacts in connection with the KGB during Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union between 1959 and 1962.

It is difficult to overstate the significance that Yuri Nosenko's defection assumed in the investigation of President Kennedy's as-

sassination. If Mr. Nosenko turned out to be a bona fide defector, if

his information were to be believed, then we could conclude that

the KGB and the Soviet Union had nothing to do with Lee Harvey

Oswald in 1953 and therefore had nothing to do with President

Kennedy's murder.

If, on the other hand, Mr. Nosenko had been programed in

advance by the KGB to minimize KGB connections with Oswald, if

Mr. Nosenko was giving us false information about Oswald's con-

tacts with the KGB in 1959 to 1962, it was fair for us to surmise

that there may have been an Oswald-KGB connection in November

1963 more specifically that Oswald was acting as a Soviet agent

when he shot President Kennedy.

If it were shown that Oswald was in fact acting as a Soviet agent

when he shot President Kennedy, the consequences to the United

States of America and, indeed, to the world, would have been

staggering. Thus it became a matter of the utmost importance to

this Government to determine the bona fides of Mr. Yuri Nosenko.

Mr. Nosenko arrived in the country in February 1964. By the end

us that the task of evaluating Mr. Nosenko's credibility would not be easy.

On April 2, 1964, as Deputy Director of Plans, I, along with David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division and Mr. Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel to the CIA, met with Mr. Nicholas Katzenback, then Deputy Attorney General of the United States; Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chief of the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department; Mr. William E. Foley, who was then Mr. Yeagley's first Asistant in the Internal Security Division; and Mr. Garold f. riese from the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department.

The meeting took place in Mr. Katzenbach's office in the Justice

Department. The purpose of the meeting was to define Mr. Nosen-

ko's legal status in the United States and to anticipate what kind

of legal problems might arise in connection with the Agency's

on going custody of Mr. Nosenko.

The Agency provided me a copy of the memorandum for the

record written by Mr. Lawrence Houston describing this meeting

on April 2, 1964, and a second memorandum which reflects the

substance of a telephone call from Mr. Foley on the following day,

April 3, 1964. These documents were in part declassified by the

Agency on September 18, 1978, and I would like to make them part

of the record of these proceedings.

During the meeting of April 2, 1964, the Department of Justice

was fully informed of Mr. Nosenko's status with the Agency and

the Department's opinion was requested as to the scope of the

Agency's ongoing authority with respect to Mr. Nosenko.

As Mr. Houston's memorandums relate, Mr. Nosenko's technical

status in the United States was one of "exclusion and parole,"

which means that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had

technically excluded Mr. Nosenko from the United States but had

also temporarily "paroled him" to the custody of the Central Intel-

ligence Agency.

It is my understanding that the terms of the parole provided that

Nosenko would remain in the custody of the Agency unless it

was determined whether Mr. Nosenko should be deported or

whether he should be permitted to settle in the United States.

If Mr. Nosenko violated the terms of the parole, he would be

deported. As these memorandums indicate, it was the opinion of

the Justice Department that the Agency was free "to take any

action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole." That opin-

ion was expressed to us in the meeting of April 2, 1964, and

repeated to us the following day by way of a telephone call from

Mr. Foley, who had been requested by Mr. Katzenbach to check

and to confirm the Department's legal opinion.

In addition to the Justice Department, the Interagency Commit-

tee on Defectors was also fully informed of Mr. Nosenko's status.

The agency and that committee concurred, I believe, with the legal

position adopted by the Department of Justice. The Interagency

Committee on Defectors was the Government body which was

formed in order to preside over the care, feeding, and general

treatment of defectors.

That committee is composed of representatives from the Central

Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the De-

fense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the De-

partment of State, and the Immigration and Naturalization

Service' as the Rockefeller Commission report indicated, Mr. Nosenko's

confinement--and I quote from the report, "was approved by the

Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, the Attor-

ney General, and the U.S. Intelligence Board; selected Members of

the Congress were also aware to some extent of the confinement."

End of quotation and end of my statement.

Chairman STOKES. So then, do I understand that based upon that

meeting it was your opinion then that this man was being held

legally and not in violation of law?

Mr. HELMS. It was our opinion that--l don't know, I am not a

lawyer, I have to be careful of my words--hut let me just say it was

our impression we had the authority to hold him as we were

holding him.

Chairman STOKES. At the time you testified to our committee

here in executive session, is that what you said to us?

Mr. HELMS. No. I say, when I went through the transcript of' my

testimony that day on August 9, I found that I characterized his

confinement in various ways, so I composed this statement in order

to straighten the matter out as we understood it.

Chairman STOKES. Now, can you recall what Mr. Katzenbach

said in that meeting? You were present and Mr. Katzenbach was

present; right?

Mr. HELMS. Yes

Chairman STOKES. Can you tell the committee what Mr. Katzen-

bach said on that occasion about the situation?

Mr. HELMS. What we remember about this, Mr. Stokes, is pretty

well encompassed in here, that we shared with him the problem we

had in connection with Mr. Nosenko. We identified to him why the

problem was very serious. We pointed out that there might be

difficulties in connection with holding him. Suppose that Mr. No-

got a lawyer; then what did we do about it? How did we ever

establish what his bona fides were?

In other words, we had a whole series of problems which we were

sharing with the Justice Department in an effort to get some help

or assistance, how we ought to go about this matter and ascertain

what our authorities to do it were. That was the purpose of the

meeting. But 15 years later I certainly do not remember direct

quotations, from either Mr. Katzenbach or myself.

Chairman STOKES. But it would be fair to characterize the situa-

tion as saying that he did make comment upon the situation and

give you advice?

Mr. HELMS. That is right.

Chairman STOKES. Now, Mr. Helms, yesterday Mr. Katzenbach

appeared before this committee and testified in the same hearing

room. I want to read to you from the transcript of that testimony

and then ask for your comment:

Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Katzenbach, Mr, Sawyer asked you about the decision to sign off for Mr. Nosenko. Can you tell us whom it was that came to you and asked for your permission to begin the interrogation of Nosenko?

Mr. KATZENBACH. I don't recall anybody doing so, Mr. Chairman. I understand that Mr. Helms had a conversation with me or thinks he recalls he had a conversation with me on it. I have no recollection of that conversation but perhaps his recollection is better than mine. I don't know. I don't recall any such conversation.

Chairman STOKES. Was this your testimony, that you don't recall anyone. talking to you about it?

Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, sir, that is my testimony.

Chairman STOKES. At any time?

Mr. KATZENBACH. At any time.

Chairman STOKES. How did you learn of it?

Mr. KATZENBACH. I learned of it when the gentleman writing a book called me up about 3 or 4 months ago or 6 months ago, and asked me about it. And I said, who is Nosenko?

Chairman STOKES. That would be Mr. Epstein?

Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, sir, Edward J. Epstein, right. And that was the first time that I heard of it, to my recollection.

Chairman STOKES. So, then, so that the record is patently c]ear on this point, during your tenure you knew absolutely nothing at all of' this situation?

Mr. KATZENBACH. Nothing that I can recall at this time. It was quite a while ago, but I have absolutely no recollection of Mr. Nosenko or anything to do with him during that period of time.

Chairman STOKES. While you held the office that you held, were you at any time requested to give your approval to treating any defector in this manner?

Mr. KATZENBACH. No sir. The only connections that I can recall with the CIA at all fell into two categories One was when they wished to, wiretap or some electronic device to be put within this country they came to me, and the only other thing was whenever they wanted a book suppressed they came to me and I told them not to do it?

Chairman STOKES Told them what?

Mr. KATZENBACH. Told them not to do it, that there was not any way you were going to do it. Those were the only ways, at least offhand, when I none that I recall as Deputy. A little bit l guess at the time of the Cuban missile crisis and perhaps some at the time of the Cuban prisoner exchange, but I had very little connection with the CIA. And I don't recall except for those occasions their ever asking me any legal advice whatsoever perhaps for good reason.

Chairman STOKES. Are you absolutely certain that you cannot recall any conversation with Mr. Helms about Nosenko?

Mr. KATZENBACK. I am certain that I don't recall it, yes, sir. I can't flatly deny such a conversation occurred, but I have no recollection it. It is quite a while ago and I believe if it was as dramatic as put by Congressman sawyer, I would remember it. I was simply informed that somebody was being questioned. There was a potential defector, I might not recall that.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you.

Any other questions?

Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Yes.

Mr. Katzenbach, I don't know whether you were informed of the details of the situation, but we had testimony by a spokesman for the CIA so that it is not just a

statement of some employee or something. He was designated by the present Director to come here and present the story because he was supposed to be the most familiar with it since he had reviewed it for the CIA.

He stated in substance, Mr. Nosenko was taken into custody in this country by the CIA after defection or after alleged defection, held in a so-called safe house on a diet of tea and porridge twice a day, was allowed no reading material. The guards were instructed neither to talk to him or smile to him. He was subjected to 48 hours at a crack interrogation. This being while they built a separate facility somewhere else in the country; namely, a device described by him as a bank vault, and then built a house around the bank vault to put this man in and then kept him there under the equivalent of some 3 years with that kind of thing, 1,277 days to be specific, at which point they finally gave up and gave him some emolument and put him on their payroll and let him go.

And then they gave as their--I questioned on the authority to do a thing like that. Did they have any kind of process, and they said other than the fact that Helms had conferred with you and gotten your OK, that this would be legal.

And I just found it awfully difficult to believe that. And that is why--and I don't imagine it would be the kind of thing that you would be asked to OK enough that you would not rather clearly remember the incident if it had occurred.

Mr. KATZENBACH. If the facts that you have just set forth to me, Congressman, had ever been made known to me, I would recollect it, I am certain; and I would hope to goodness I would not have given the legal advice that is claimed.

Mr. SAYWER. It makes me feel better about it. Thank you.

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Having heard Mr. Katzenbach's testimony of yesterday, can you

reconcile his testimony to this committee with your statement just

read to this committee?

Mr. HELMS. I can only say, Mr. Stokes, that it is very hard to

reconcile. I think the basic point at issue here is really whether the

meeting with him took place at all. What happened after the

meeting is something he was not responsible for as far as I am

aware.

Let me read to you the memorandum for the record which Mr.

Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel of CIA, wrote on April

3, 1964. I have a copy in front of me. It is headed Memorandum for

the Record and the subject is the Nosenko case.

It reads:

Mr. Helms, Mr. Murphy, and I met with Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, J. Walter Yeagley, William E. Foley, and Harold F. Ries, on April 2, 1964. Mr. Helms outlined the problems foreseeable in our future relations with Nosenko and asked the opinion of the Justice representatives on what we could do to control the situation. I pointed out that his technical status is one of exclusion and parole-or more technically, deferment and parole.

Paragraph 2:

After some discussion, Mr. Foley stated it was his opinion that Agency representatives could take any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check this and let me know and Mr. Foley later confirmed this position by telephone.

I in turn, after the meeting, reviewed the parole agreement and provided an interpretation thereof for Director of Security, a copy of which is attached hereto. Also, I informed Mr. Foley of this interpretation. Signed, Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel.

The attachment is a memorandum also dated April 3, 1964. It is

signed by Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel. It is a memoran-

dum for the director of security. That would be the officer who was

the director of the security office of the Central Intelligence

Agency. The subject is Parole status of defectors:

On 2 April 1964, we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by INS--

that is the Immigration and Naturalization Service, I interpret

here so there will not be a lack of clarity--

whose inspection by INS is deferred upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency. It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.

That, I believe, is paragraph 1 of this memorandum, Mr. Stokes.

The balance of the memorandum has been excised and therefore is

not on the sheet there.

Chairman STOKES. Then, in light of the document which you

have just read and along with your other testimony, then obviously

the statement of Mr. Katzenbach to this committee yesterday could

not be true, could it?

Mr. HELMS. No; I am afraid it is not.

Mr. PREYER. Chairman Stokes, may I interrupt?

Chairman STOKES. Certainly.

Mr. HELMS. I would like to say, because I would like to be clear

with this committee, that I asked my attorney to be in touch with

Mr. Katzenbach some weeks ago in connection with this matter. It

is reflected in his testimony that it was brought to his attention

that I had this meeting with him. I did not want to have this

committee think I pulled this as a surprise on Mr. Katzenbach and

he came down here innocently and had no opportunity to review

the facts if he cared to.

Chairman STOKES. Then he was appropriately advised prior to

his appearance here yesterday of the memorandums you just read?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know that he was advised of the memoran-

dums, but he was advised certainly of our recollection of this

meeting.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PREYER. Mr. Helms, I understand that you are requesting

that this document be made a part of the record. I would like to

ask the clerk if she will mark it as an exhibit so that we can enter

it into the record at this point.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, as a point of clarity, is it just these memoranda

that you want to make a part of the record? My statement is in the

transcript so I don't think that is necessary. I think these are the

two documents.

Mr. PREYER. The document will be marked as exhibit F-4/3 and

made a part of the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

JFK EXHIBIT F-413

3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Nosenko Case

1. Mr. Helms, Mr. Murphy and I met with Mr. Nicholas

deB. Katzenbach, Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Mr. William E. Foley,

and Mr. Harold F. Reis on the Nosenko case on 2 April 1964.

Mr. Helms outlined the problems forseeable in our future relations

with Nosenko and asked the opinion of the Justice representatives

on what we could do to control the situation. I pointed out that his

technical status was one of exclusion and parole for more technically

deferment of inspection and parole).

2. After some discussion, Mr. Foley stated it was his opinion

that Agency representatives could take any action necessary to carry

out the terms of the parole. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to

check this and let me know and Mr. Foley later confirmed this position

by telephone. I, in turn, after the meeting reviewed the parole agree-

ment and provided an interpretation thereof for the Director of Security.

a copy of which is attached hereto. Also I informed Mr. Foley of this

interpretation.

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON

General Counsel

Declassified 19 September 1978

by Anthony A. Lapham, General

Counsel

JFK EXHIBIT F-413 cont.

3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Parole Status of Defectors

1. On 2 April 1964 we had a discussion with the Department

of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by I&NS is deferred

upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency.

It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible

for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.

Declassified (paragraph 1 only)

19 September 1978 by Anthony A.

Lapham, General Counsel.

/s/Lawrence R. Houston

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON

General Counsel

Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Now, Mr. Helms, I note that the memorandum does not give

indication from which Mr. Katzenbach would be able to draw the

conclusion with reference to the way that the CIA intended to treat

this man. That is not in that memorandum, is it?

Mr. HELMS. No, it is not in the memorandum as of the time that

the meeting with Mr. Katzenbach was held. Deliberations were

still going on inside the Agency as to what exactly to do about Mr.

Nosenko, and as things developed over the months, I don't think

that Mr. Katzenbach can be held responsible for that and I have no

reason to want to involve him in it.

Chairman STOKES. Is it fair also to say that in all probability he

was never informed of the way this man was treated?

Mr. HELMS. In all probability, that is correct.

Chairman STOKES. Now, how long did Mr. Nosenko remain in

CIA custody?

Mr. HELMS. I think all told, I think it was from 1964 when he

defected until he was resettled with the new identity which I

believe was in 1969 or 1970.

Chairman STOKES. Can you tell us what unit within the CIA had

the primary responsibility for handling Mr. Nosenko in 1964?

Mr. HELMS. My recollection is that the office of security was

given the responsibility for his housekeeping, his care, his feeding,

his guarding, and that the Soviet bloc division had the responsibil-

ity for his interrogation.

Chairman STOKES. Did the Soviet Russia division continue to

have responsibility for questioning Nosenko until he was released

from CIA custody in 1969?

Mr. HELMS. No. I believe that it was in 1967 that the decision

was made or I made the decision if you would prefer that, that the

case simply could not go on in that fashion it had to be resolved.

Therefore, a change was made. Nosenko was turned over to an

officer in the office of security who had made an examination of

the case. He felt that he could get along well with Nosenko and

that possibly he could, if he couldn't solve the problem of his bona

fides, at least he might be able to solve the problem of how we

were going to resettle him on the American scene.

I was rather puzzled by some of Mr. Hart's testimony the other

day before this committee. He seemed to go into lurid detail about

Nosenko's treatment, but when it came time to make his contribu-

tion to the purposes of the committee hearing, in other words, what

Nosenko knew about Oswald, he had no clarification to make and

nothing to contribute.

Yet he was here as the official representative of the Director of

Central Intelligence, as I understand it. It was almost as though

his purpose was to use his testimony before this committee to

excoriate some of his former colleagues for the handling of the Nosenko case.

In any event, I never heard of the note alleged to have been

handwritten by the "Deputy Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division"

using such sensational terms as "liquidate the man, commit him to

a looney bin," et cetera. These options were never presented to me,

were never entertained by me, and were never considered.

The problem was to resettle Nosenko in American society and

this is what the Agency did. Any other assertions are false as far

as I personally am aware. I would not like to see perpetuated on

indefinitely into the history of this country that there was any

consideration given by senior officials of the Agency to those op-

tions that were identified in this lurid, handwritten memorandum.

I don't know how the thing happened to get written. I don't know

how it happened to be held in the files. I don't know how it

happened to be part of Mr. Hart's role to bring it down here, but in

any event, I want to put to rest once and for all that this was never

considered.

Chairman STOKES. Now you have mentioned a security officer.

When did the security officer assume the responsibility for han-

dling Nosenko?

Mr. HELMS. My recollection Mr. Stokes, is that it was about 1967,

some time in 1967.

Chairman STOKES. So at that time would they have assumed

primary responsibility and taken it away then from the Soviet

bloc?

Mr. HELMS. Well, they assumed primary responsibility. I think

that is the fair thing. I had asked Adm. Rufus Taylor, who sadly

died the other day but who became Deputy Director of Central

Intelligence after I was made Director, to make it his personal

responsibility to look into all aspects of the Nosenko case in an

effort to get it resolved.

He had done a lot of work on this case and one of his recommen-

dations as I recall it was that this be turned over to the office of

security and that we try an entirely different approach.

Chairman STOKES. Can you tell us why the responsibility for

handling Nosenko in terms of questioning was transferred from the

SR people over to the security officer?

Mr. HELMS. It was just another approach we were attempting. In

other words, wee wanted to take him away from those people who

had been interrogating him and see if a quiet, solicitous and let's

say, favorable approach were used, that we might be able to solve

the problem of his bona fides but at least get him in the frame of

mind where we could resettle him.

Chairman STOKES. How long a period of time was Nosenko actu-

ally held in this status?

Mr. HELMS. Well, during the period of 1964 to 1967 he was held

under Spartan circumstances. In 1967 when he was turned over to

the office of security he was moved to a safe house where he

certainly was in confinement but lived under very comfortable

conditions, perhaps as well as anybody in this room.

Chairman STOKES. Now, during that 3-year period, and I suppose

you would say it is 3 years he was held in confinement, as a basis

of Mr. Hart's testimony a few days ago, I posed the question to him

that the man was actually being held in jail, wasn't he. His answer

was substantially yes.

How would you characterize the period?

Mr. HELMS. I find no fault with that characterization.

Chairman STOKES. Initially, can you tell us how the individuals

who handled Mr. Nosenko for the SR division had been selected?

Mr. HELMS. When the defection took place in Geneva, or at least before it took place, two officers were sent to Geneva to talk to Mr. Nosenko. One was a high officer in the SR division and the other was a case officer who not only spoke fluent Russian but had had a great deal of experience in handling Soviet agent cases and this seemed to be a good team as far as those in charge though at the time, and so did I.

Chairman STOKES. Can you tell us how knowledgeable or how expert they were in terms of the Oswald case?

Mr. HELMS. I don't have any recollection of that any more, Mr. Stokes. I don't think that we chose them because of their knowledge- ability in the Oswald case initially. This issue was to decide about the defection of this man in the first place.

The Oswald matter really hadn't gotten viable until it was indicated he knew something about it, and then when we got him to the United States, what he knew about it. Actually, I think that it may be of interest to the committee that in attempting to establish the bona fides of someone, it is necessary to have information in some depth of the facts about which they are talking.

With respect to Nosenko, we put people who were knowledgeable about the Soviet Union and Soviet mores, and so forth, on the case because we had more information about those things and could check his statements out much better than if we were using something about Lee Harvey Oswald. He had been in the Soviet Union and we knew very little about him, because I would like to remind you, Mr. Stokes, that what is known about Lee Harvey Oswald today was certainly not known in early 1964. This is all material that has been developed since.

I think one has to be fair with history that when we go back to February 1964, the knowledgeability of anybody in the Government on Lee Harvey Oswald was very limited, even more limited than it is now.

Chairman STOKES. Wouldn't I understand that first they did know he was a KGB officer at the time he came to you; correct?

Mr. HELMS. That is what he told us.

Chairman STOKES. You did know that Oswald been in Russia, did you not?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, we knew that he had been in rUssia, certainly.

Chairman STOKES. And as a part of your responsibility to the Warren Commission was to give them such information as came to your knowledge regarding Oswald in Russia, was it not?

Mr. HELMS. Certainly, Mr. Stokes.

Chairman STOKES- And in establishing this man's bona fides,

would it not be logical that you would want to know everything he

knew about Oswald as a part of the interrogation process so that

you might establish his bona fides through that?

Mr. HELMS. But I thought that he was asked about what he knew

about Oswald. I thought there were four or five interrogations, one

by the FBI and some by us during this period. Am I wrong?

Chairman STOKES. Well, he was under the custody of the CIA.

You have told us that.

Mr. HELMS. But other people had access to him. The FBI was

given access to them. We gave other people access to these people if

they requested it. It was the FBI's statement to the Warren Com-

mission quoting Nosenko based on their own interrogation that led

me weeks later to go down and talk with the Chief Justice of the

United States and point out with him that we could not go bail, we

could not vouch for the bona fides of this man, and therefore we

could not vouch for his statement.

Chairman STOKES. Yes, and this was the precise problem that

you were confronted with. You knew you had an important issue

on your hands, didn't you?

Mr. HELMS. Certainly.

Chairman STOKES. And it was extremely important by virtue of

the high level conference which you had had, which you referred to

this morning, that you had been able to establish his bona fides;

isn't that correct?

Mr. HELMS. We were doing our best to do so.

Chairman STOKES. So it is in that area, then, I would think, that

you would want to see the top interrogators, not only those expert

in interrogating with reference to the Soviet Union, but also about

events in the Soviet Union such as Oswald would be important to

you to have him interrogated about?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, I was not present at these interrogations

and I don't know the exact questions. I assume there is a record

available someplace. But it seems to me that in posing this ques-

tion this way, to me it is damned if you do and damned if you

don't. You are damned if you hold a fellow too long and treat him

badly because you would like to find out what he does know about

Oswald, and you are damned the other way if you have not dug his

teeth out to find out what he knows about Oswald.

I don't know sir, the answer. If we had to do it over, I don't know

what we would do. We would probably do it differently, but I don't

know how we would have arrived at the truth in the space of time

we had available to us.

You may recall from the record that Mr. Nosenko, at the time he

defected and before, was a very heavy drinker. One of the problems

we had with him during his first period of time in the United

States was he didn't want to do anything except drink and carouse.

We had problems with him in an incident in Baltimore where he

started punching up a bar and so forth.

One of the reasons to hold him in confinement was to get him

away from the booze and settle him down and see if we could make

some sense with him. The fact that he may have been held too long

was therefore deplorable, but nevertheless we were doing our best.

Chairman STOKES. Well, in light of what you are now saying to

us about the fact that you are damned if you do and damned if you

don't, was it important to you that you be kept informed regularly

of everything that he was saying and everything that he was doing

et cetera?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Stokes, I felt that certainly I should be kept

generally informed, but during the period of the Warren Commis-

sion, they are the ones who should be kept informed, the FBI

should be kept informed, and that after the Warren Commission

had made its report and things then were not guided by their

investigation, we still went on with the job of attempting to find

out what this man represented.

Chairman STOKES. But if, as you say, as you have just indicated,

the Warren Commission needed to be informed and so forth, and

wasn't it your direct responsibility to inform the commission?

Mr. HELMS. But I thought I did. I thought I told them that we

couldn't establish his bona fides.

Chairman STOKES. Well, in order for you to be able to communi-

cate with the Warren Commission, you had to get information from

some source, didn't you?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Chairman STOKES. So my question to you is: What direction did

give those under you as to how often you were to be briefed,

how often you ought to be given the results of the interrogation or

whatever was occurring with this man?

Mr. HELMS. Certainly I stayed current to that extent. If there

bad been the slightest intimation that we were prepared to vouch

for his bona fides or that the interregation reached that point it

would have been brought to me immediately.

I think that if I don't any longer recall the exact date, but I

think it was in June or something of 1964, that after getting the

permission of the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, I

went to see the Chief Justice privately to point out to him what

our difficulties in this matter were. It seems to me I was as forth-

coming as a man could be, what else could I do? What else should I have done?

What did you tell him about your difficulties?

What were they?

Mr. HELMS. I told him we were not able to satisfy ourselves that

the man was what he was purported to be, that the jobs that he

had held were the ones that he really did hold, that there were

inconsistencies in his testimony, that what he had to say about the

Oswald case didn't make sense to us, and that, therefore, I simply

wanted to point out to the Chief Justice that I was sorry but

whatever the FBI had given him or given the Commission about

what Mr. Nosenko had said about Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald, that I

felt he should take into consideration the fact that we could not

vouch for his bona fides and therefore they should not take at full

strength what he said. It was up to them to make their evaluation,

but I felt we owed this to him.

Chairman STOKES. In order for you to tell the Chief Justice that,

how often had you been briefed?

Mr. HELMS. I have no recollection any longer, Mr. Stokes.

Chairman STOKES. In terms of the interrogation that took place

of Oswald, I'm sorry, Nosenko, were the interrogators instructed to

pose a large number of questions relative to Oswald to Nosenko?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Stokes, there was no issue more central in those

days than an effort to straighten out this business about Oswald.

But I would submit in evidence, I don't know whether you have

been an interrogator, sir, but there are so many questions you can

ask about based on the information that was known about Oswald

at the time.

If my facts are straight, the information about Oswald that was

known was that he had gone to the Soviet Union, that he ex-

pressed a desire to give up his citizenship. That is what he told the

American Embassy. He had gone to Minsk, married a Russian girl,

which was suspicious in its own right.

He then decided to come back to the United States and virtually

disappeared, but it was not the CIA's jurisdiction to keep an eye on

him in the United States and the amount of information available

at that time based on which one could make an interrogation was

pretty thin for the simple reason that how were we going to find

out in the Soviet Union what Oswald had done there except from

his own statements?

We had no independent means of verification. We didn't have

that good an organization inside the Soviet Union. We had no

means of following up on these leads.

Chairman STOKES. In light of your statements in this context, let

me cite to you the testimony of Mr. Hart to this committee and get

your comment on that.

Mr. Hart, with reference to the matter of whether Nosenko was

being incarcerated or being questioned, said to this committee this:

Mr. HART. Insofar as I can tell, the assumption among the top leadership of the agency was that during this period of incarceration Mr. Nosenko was being questioned or interrogated.

That is flatly contrary to the facts because although he was incarcerated for 1,277 days, on only 292 days was he in part questioned. We do not, it is difficult to tell just how many hours of questioning there took place on those 292 days when he actually was questioned. The rest of the time, which is 77 percent of the total time of incarceration, he was left entirely unoccupied and was not being questioned. There was, in other words, no effort being made to get at more information which he might have.

Do you agree with that statement?

Mr. HELMS. I have no comment to make on it. Mr. Hart, I gather,

was appointed by Director George Bush in 1976 to look into the

whole Nosenko case. I have been informed of that in recent times. I

assume he looked into it fairly and squarely. I would assume also

that this committee has talked thoroughly with all the interroga-

tors and has verified independently whether these facts are true or

not. I have no capacity for doing that.

Chairman STOKES. So you take no issue with that statement?

Mr. HELMS. None. I don't know its merits one way or the other.

Chairman STOKES. Then I take it from that you in no way contest

the statement of Mr. Hart?

Mr. HELMS. I have no basis for contesting it, Mr. Stokes. I mean,

he has a record there. I simply was saying that I have no independ-

ent verification of the number of days he was interrogated. I would

assume, though, that the committee does have an independent

verification because I believe that the interrogators are still alive

and I assume the committee has talked to them.

Is this correct?

Chairman STOKES. I think that is substantially correct, yes.

Mr. Helms, in January 1968 when the SR division report con-

cerning Nosenko was issued, what was the Agency's position re-

garding Mr. Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. HELMS. There were those in the agency who believed he was

bona fide and there were those in the agency who did not. I never

recall having resolved the case in my own mind one way Or the

other. My preoccupation at the time was to get Mr. Nosenko reset-

tled. If there were those who felt there was a reasonable chance he

was bona fide, that was all right with me, but as far as I am aware,

never signed off on any document or made any final decisions

about his bona fides.

If you have a document, I would appreciate seeing it because I

have not been shown one, and if my recollection is not accurate, I

don't want to mislead this committee. I want to be absolutely fair

and truthful and forthcoming.

Chairman STOKES. Perhaps it may help refresh your recollection

that at the time the committee took your testimony previously, Mr.

Goldsmith asked you the question: "Is it not a fact that the SR

report of 1968 indicated that in fact Mr. Nosenko was not a bona

fide defector?" Your answer at that time was: "I don't remember

firsthand what the thrust of the report was."

So I take it, then, that your testimony today is that you still do

not recall?

Mr. HELMS. No. But I am sorry, 1 must have misunderstood your

earlier question. I am sorry. I thought that you were asking me

what my opinion was about that.

Chairman STOKES. No, no.

Mr. HELMS. I am sorry.

Chairman STOKES. Basically, what we are asking you is this: In

January 1968, when this report came out of the SR division, what

was the Agency's position regarding Nosenko bona fides?

Mr. HELMS. Well, the Agency's position would not have been

reflected in the 1968 report, The Agency's position would have been

one that l would have signed off on and I don't recall ever having

made personally the decision based on recommendations and var-

ious other factors involved, whether he was bona fide or not. I

simply was trying to explain that m)' interest then was different.

Chairman STOKES. Well, then, can you tell us in January of 1968

the Agency's position with regard to the veracity of the informa-

tion Nosenko had provided concerning Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. I don't think any judgment has ever been made

about that. I thought I read in the newspapers--and I assume the

newspapers reported accurately--that Mr. Hart, after all his inves-

tigation, was not able to tell you that Nosenko was accurate about

Oswald or not accurate about Oswald, if he could not do it--

Chairman STOKES. To the contrary. He said to the committee,

based upon everything he knew about him, that the testimony he

had given this committee, he said I would not use it, so he did have

an opinion.

Mr. HELMS. He said he would not use it?

Chairman STOKES. That is what he said.

Mr. HELMS. That confuses me.

Chairman Stokes. Why?

Mr. HELMS. Well, it confuses me because isn't that a copout? If

you are not going to use it, then it is not true.

Chairman STOKES. That is substantially correct, that would be

my own interpretation.

Now let me ask you this: Wouldn't your analysis and the doubt

which you had of this man's overall bona fides also bear upon the

question of what he was saying to you and through you to the

Warren Commission about Oswald, that is, if you doubted his gen-

eral bona fides, wouldn't you have to doubt what he was saying to

you about Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, that is why I went to see the Chief Justice.

Chairman STOKES. Now let me ask you this: After the SR division

issued its report in 1968, was the Nosenko case reinvestigated by

the security officer?

Mr. HELMS. Oh, I think the ground was gone over not only by

that security officer, but I think that through the weeks after that

a long interrogation, or if you don't want to call it an interroga-

tion, let's say an elicitation, was carried on with Nosenko to find

out what he knew about a whole host of things, including the

Oswald case.

I believe it was during that latter period that he had additional

contributions to make about the size of the files that the KGB held

on Oswald and matters of this kind.

Chairman STOKES. Let me ask you this: In light of what you said

to us this morning, would you agree that the consequences of the

Nosenko case for the American intelligence community were quite

great particularly if it turned out that he was not a bona fide

defector? I think you may have commented on some of that in your

first statement.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I did, Mr. Stokes, but I agree with what you

said.

Chairman STOKES. I would like to call your attention to page 137

of the declassified transcript which you have there at the witness

table with you. Lines 6 through 20. Do you have that?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. This, of course, is your testimony before this

subcommittee of this committe earlier.

Now, at that time did you testify that you had no recollection of

ever signing off on any piece of paper that made Nosenko a consul-

tant to the CIA and that you never agreed to any such thing?

Mr. HELMS. When I made that statement in executive session on

August 9, it was my distinct impression that we had made an

arrangement or signed a contract with Nosenko which made him

an independent contractor. In other words, it was a relationship

between him and the Agency whereby he would do research work

under controlled circumstances and we would control the environ-

ment, what documents he saw, what he did, and in this way we

would be justified in seeing if his expertise was of any help to us,

and, second, under this document we could pay him so that he

could live and eventually get to be resettled.

I was not aware at that time that the independent contractor

provision had along with it in the document the word "consultant."

If I was aware of it at the time, I never thought about it. I must

confess that my thought of what a consultant is has been changed

in present times, because I am a consultant to various American

businesses now and my relationship to them is not the relationship

I contracted for with Nosenko, so this is a semantic problem.

I can only say that I am sorry that I was maybe the slightest bit

misleading, but I have now explained it and I hope that satisfies

you.

Chairman STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I will ask that an exhibit in

the possession of the Clerk be marked as JFK F-531. I will ask that

a copy of it be delivered to the witness and that the exhibit be

made a part of the record at this time.

Mr. PREYER. If there is no objection, the exhibit, F-531, will be

entered into the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

JFK EXHIBIT F-531

JFK EXHIBIT F-531 cont.

Mr. HELMS. I have the document before me, Mr. Stokes, now. It

is a document dated October 5, 1972.

Chairman STOKES. That is the document. Can you tell us what

that document is?

Mr. HELMS. The subject of it is retroactive reimbursement of

Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko. It entails a description of his case, what

he was promised in the way of money, and gives at the end a

suggestion as to how the moneys might be handled. This in turn

was passed up the line in the Agency and was approved on October

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Helms, I would direct your attention to

page 4 of that document and ask you whether or not your signa-

ture appears on that document?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, it does, beside the date October 18, 1972. That is

my signature.

Chairman STOKES. Now, I will ask you to read three of the

paragraphs from this document, paragraphs 6, 7 and 9. Would you

do that, please, read it out loud?

Mr. HELMS. Six, seven, and nine?

Chairman STOKES. Yes, sir.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

As of April 1969, Mr. Nosenko signed a 1-year contractual agreement for $16,500, including a clause giving assistance to him in resettlement expenses in the amount of $8,000. In March 1970, Mr. Nosenko signed a new contract for 2 years at $18,500 per annum. At about the same time he was provided with certain financial assistance, $20,000 being for the down payment on a new house and $5,000 for other related household expenses. Mr. Nosenko's contract was renewed at the new rate of $19,500 per annum on March 1, 1971 and the contract was again renewed in February 1972 at the salary of $21,000 per annum.

Paragraph 7:

An analysis of this case clearly indicates that Mr. Nosenko has been an extremely valuable source, one who has identified many hundreds of Soviet intelligence officers, and he has otherwise provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization of the KGB, its operational doctrine and methods.

Then I find a blank and written in here in somebody's hand is

sensitive information. The remainder of the sentence reads:

Have been forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation based on data from Mr. Nosenko. He has conducted numerous special security reviews on Soviet subjects of specific intelligence interest and he has proven himself to be invaluable in exploring counterintelligence leads. He recently authored a book which is of interest to the Agency. In effect, Mr. Nosenko has shown himself to be a productive and hard working defector, who is rehabilitated and favorably disposed to the Agency.

Paragraph 9:

In summary, the original oral agreement with Mr. Nosenko is fully documented and supports his claim; his resettlement since 1967 has been relatively smooth, with no significant security problems having developed; and he continues to function at the present time as a highly productive and useful source of information on the KGB. In view of these various considerations, it is requested that the payment of $125,000 to Mr. Nosenko be approved. These funds would be paid out of unliquidated obligations applicable to lapsed appropriations.

The sentence stops there and it is written in somebody's hand-

writing, "sensitive sources and methods information." And the

memorandum has the signature below.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you.

In paragraph 9 where it says: "and he continues to function at

the present time as a highly productive and useful source of infor-

mation on the KGB," that does not, to you, connote the activities of

a consultant?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

Chairman STOKES. That's how you would interpret that?

Mr. HELMS. That is the kind of information we get from any

agency. I am sorry, but my impression today, and it may not have

been 5 years ago, I don't know, but today my impression of a

consultant is one that has a closer relationship with the organiza-

tion for which he is working than an agent does in an intelligence

relationship. They are insulated from certain kinds of information,

they are insulated from certain access, and insulated from a lot of

things.

Consultant is not necessarily so. Consultant is a very wide rang-

ing term which covers all kinds of things in our language. I would

just not like to see a reference at that time to his having been a

consultant. I have been told since, I don't know how accurately,

that Nosenko has been seen in the CIA headquarters building at

Langley. I guess if he has access to the building out there, maybe

he is a consultant now, but he was not considered one in my time.

Chairman STOKES. I see.

Mr. Chairman, I will ask that the clerk mark another exhibit in

her possession, JFK exhibit F-537 and that a copy of it be shown to

the witness.

Mr. HELMS. I have the document in my hands. It is JFK exhibit

F-537.

Chairman STOKES. Have you had a chance to read that docu-

ment?

Mr. HELMS. No.

Chairman STOKES. Could you take the time to familiarize your-

self with it?

Mr. HELMS. This is an interrogatory which this committee pre-

sented to the Agency; is that correct?

Chairman STOKES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. HELMS. I have read the document now, Mr. Stokes.

Chairman STOKES. All right.

Mr. Helms, prior to referring you to that particular document,

would you look at page 133 of the declassified transcript before

you, beginning at line 11 1/2. It looks like where Mr. Goldsmith

poses a question to you and your answer follows.

Mr. HELMS. Is this where Mr. Goldsmith says, "What about at

the conclusion of the [security officer's] work?"

Chairman STOKES. That is right.

Would you please read Mr. Goldsmith's question and your

answer?

Mr. HELMS [reading]:

MR. GOLDSMITH. What about at the conclusion of [the security officer's] work when he issued his report, at that time did the Agency have a position with regard to Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. HELMS. I do not believe so. At least during my time there I do not recall us ever taking a position as an agency.

Chairman STOKES. Now let me ask you, having read that ques-

tion and your answer to it, is that your best recollection?

Mr. HELMS. That is my best recollection, Mr. Stokes. I notice that

in this document which you tell me the Agency has provided, they

say that the final conclusion was that he is a bona fide defector. I

simply do not recall participating in any meeting or signing any

document which made the final judgment that he was a bona fide

defector.

Chairman STOKES. Let me now refer you to the exhibit, F-537

and ask you, now that is a document from the Director of Central

Intelligence is it not?

Mr. HELMS. It is not signed by him, sir, so I don't know.

Chairman STOKES. Well, on the first page it does have a signa-

ture on there.

Mr. HELMS. On the first page it just has the signature of Mr.

Breckinridge, principal coordinator for the House Select Committee

on Assassinations.

Chairman STOKES. Is there a letterhead at the top of it?

Mr. HELMS. yes, it say, "Office of Legislative Counsel."

Chairman STOKES. And ahead of that?

Mr. HELMS. The Director of Central Intelligence.

Chairman STOKES. Washington, D.C.; right?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, 20505.

Chairman STOKES. Does the first page read as follows:

1 September 1978, Mr, G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Washington D.C.

DEAR MR. BLAKEY. Forwarded herewith are answers to the interrogatories received at the close of business on 28 August 1978.

Signed, S.D. Breckinridge, Principal for HSCA with attachment.

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Chairman STOKES. Now, would you turn to the next page, com-

mencing where it says question 3, would you read everything from

that point forward?

Mr. HELMS [reading]:

Define Nosenko's present and past employment arrangements with the Central Intelligence Agency, include (a) the dates and nature of this employment; (b) the services rendered by Nosenko; (c) itemize the counting of all compensation received by Nosenko; (d) an account of the roles of Richard Helms and John McCone in authorizing Nosenko's employment and compensation arrangements for the CIA. Prior to Nosenko's defection on 4 February 1964, he was promised $50,000 for previous cooperation, $10,000 for his identification in 1962 of a particular espionage agent, and $25,000 a year compensation for future services.

Mr. Richard Helms himself approved the foregoing on 17 February 1964. Although no effort was made to fulfill the promise until some 5 years after Nosenko's defection, the original promise formed the basis for the eventual employment and/or monetary remunerations. Following acceptance of Nosenko's bona fides in late 1968, Mr. Helms approved an arrangement which resulted in Nosenko's employment as an independent contractor effective 1 March 1969. This first contract called for him to be compensated at a rate of $16,500 a year. As of 1978 he is receiving $35,327 a year (see attached annual compensation table for years 1969 to 1978).

In addition to regular yearly compensation, Nosenko was paid for the years 1964 to 1969; in November 1972 in the amount of $25,000 a year, less income tax. The total amount paid was $87,000--I beg your pardon--total amount paid was $87,052.

He also received in varying increments from March 1964 to July 1973 amounts totaling $50,000 to aid in his resettlement on the private economy (see attached table for the breakdown).

The total resettlement figure in effect satisfied that portion of the above 1964 promise to pay Nosenko $50,000 for previous cooperation. In 1976, Nosenko was paid $10,000 to satisfy that part of the above promise relating to his identification of an espionage agent. Further, he was compensated in the amount of $28,500, representing the difference between the $25,000 a year promised and the actual amount paid to him during the period 1 March 1969 to 1 March 1975.

Since 1969, the agency has contributed to Nosenko's hospitalization insurance premium. The agency has also compensated him for certain unusual medical and dental expenses.

To date, Nosenko continues to work as an independent contractor with the compensation provision being periodically amended. His work for the agency includes consultation with both the agency and the FBI on certain matters of current interest concerning Soviet intelligence activities and personnel both in the U.S. and abroad. From time to time he was also consulted by various elements of the agency on current Soviet developments and requirements. He has been, and continues to be, used as a regular lecturer at counterintelligence courses of the agency, the FBI, Air Force, OSI, and others.

Our records do not show that Mr. John McCone played any role in authorizing Nosenko's employment compensation arrangements with the CIA.

Annual compensation table.

Do you want me to go through that?

Chairman STOKES. No.

Having read this answer to the interrogatories posed to the

agency, is there anything at all in this interrogatory that you

would say is untrue?

Mr. HELMS. The only two statements, Mr. Stokes, that I would

cavil with are the one that is "Following acceptance of Nosenko's

bona fides in 1968," and I guess it appears on the last page of the

document. That is the only point. If these bona fides were estab-

lished in late 1968, I have no recollection of this having happened,

that is all. I am sorry, I just--you want me to tell the truth here. I

am doing my best.

Chairman STOKES. So then, if I understand your answer, you are

not sticking with your previous testimony with reference to the

fact that the agency never arrived at a determination on his bona

fides?

Mr. HELMS. I didn't believe they ever did. I think my other

testimony is consistent with what I am saying now. If it is not

consistent, then you and I are misunderstanding each other, and

that I would like to get straightened out right away.

Chairman STOKES. I guess where I am having difficulty is my

understanding of how you enter into this financial arrangement.

Whether you call it consultant or independent contractor or give it

any other name, how you justify entering into a contract where

you give taxpayer funds to someone Who you say in your opinion is

not bona fide.

Mr. HELMS. I think, Mr. Stokes, that I can explain--I trust I can

explain this satisfactorily. It has been said, and I believe it is true,

that in the latter days of his interrogation Mr. Nosenko provided

the agency with useful information with respect to certain Soviet

activities. I do not recall that he gave them any additional informa-

tion that helped to resolve the Oswald case or Oswald status with

the KGB.

The reimbursement was for two purposes, one, to get him reset-

tled in the United States. May I say that this was the only viable

option left to us at that time. There was no way of deporting him

to the Soviet Union; he would have been shot and killed when he

got back. He would never have been able to explain to them what

he was doing during the period that he was away. So we had only

one option and that was to try to resettle him. That was what I

had in mind to do, and he needed money and he needed

employment.

If you will study the history of Soviet defectors in this country,

they have had an extraordinarily difficult time adjusting to our

society. They have a very difficult time making money and running

businesses and being gainfully employed. I think if you will put an

interrogatory to the agency to give you a history of the resettle-

ment of defectors since 1945, you will find what I am telling you is

true. Therefore, it was a complex of matters involved in his com-

pensation; part of it was the useful information, part of it was to

get him resettled, and part was because we had no choice except to

do these things. At least we had no choice in my opinion. Maybe

somebody else would have a different opinion, but at least in our

opinion we had no choice.

Chairman STOKES. That is your total answer as to why he was

being given this kind of compensation?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Chairman STOKES. Let me now ask you this---

Mr. PREYER. There is a vote on the floor at this time. The

committee will take a 10-minute recess. The committee stands in

recess for 10 minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. PREYER. The committee will come to order.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Chairman, there are a number of other

documents which relate generally to the subjects of Mr. Helms'

testimony, but with respect to which there was not sufficient time

to ask specific questions. May they be admitted into the record as

JFK exhibit F-532 at this time?

Mr. PREYER. Without objection, so ordered.

[The exhibit referred to follows:]

JFK EXHIBIT F-532

JFK EXHIBIT F-532 cont.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Stokes, would you indulge me

moment, please. I would like to straighten something out.

Mr. Craig tells me that he feels that I did Mr. Katzenbach an

injustice in something that I said, and I would not want to do that,

so let me just modify what I said this morning.

Mr. Stokes asked me whether I thought Mr. Katzenbach's state-

ment to this committee regarding our meeting was untrue. I be-

lieve I replied in the affirmative. All I meant to say was that

couldn't count on Mr. Katzenbach's memory. I wasn't questioning

either his judgment or his integrity. I just want to make this point.

The meeting did occur but I didn't mean to imply that he testified

untruthfully before this committee.

Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Helms.

Mr. Stokes.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could just

follow up at this point in an area that gives me some concern, that

is, if I understand you correctly, I believe you said you still even

today don't really know whether Nosenko is bona fide or not;

further, it is your recollection you don't believe the agency ever

arrived at that determination, particularly when you were there.

Let me ask you this: If it were clearly proven that Nosenko's

statements concerning Oswald were untrue, what significance

would you attach to such a finding insofar as the broader question

of his overall bona fides are concerned?

Mr. HELMS. I think, Mr. Stokes, that is just the point. This is the

issue which remains, as I understand it, to this very day, that no

person familiar with the facts, of whom I am aware, finds Mr.

Nosenko's comments about Lee Harvey Oswald and the KGB to be

credible. That still hangs in the air like an incubus. I think, there-

fore, this tends to sour a great deal of one's opinion of all the other

things that he may have Contributed to the knowledge of the

intelligence community about Soviet affairs and Soviet agents and

so forth.

I do not know how one resolves this bone in the throat. And

therefore, if I sit here before you and say, Mr. Stokes, I believe that

Mr. Nosenko is a bona fide defector and you can rely on everything

he says, I am in effect saying now, Mr. Stokes, you can rely on

what he says about Lee Harvey Oswald. And I would not like to

make that recommendation to you. That is where this thing lies

and it is a most difficult question even at this late date.

Chairman STOKES. Then doesn't this raise a question, then, of a

further part of the dilemma, that if he was not, bona fide, the only

alternative, then, is what the CIA suspected, and that was that he

might have been a KGB plant sent here for the purpose of deceiv-

ing the United States?

Mr. HELMS. That is correct.

Chairman STOKES. Doesn't that logically follow?

Mr. HELMS. That is certainly true, and that was foremost in our

minds.

Chairman STOKES. So it leaves you with the conclusion, then,

that if Nosenko was lying about Oswald, that Oswald would in fact

be left as being an agent of the KGB?

Mr. HELMS. By implication.